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Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyse a powerful competence available to antitrust 
authorities in Europe in the form of the imposition of fines for the failure to 
cooperate within antitrust proceedings. While fines of that type are imposed in 
practice very rarely, the article considers the existing decisional practice of the 
Polish antitrust authority as well as the European Commission, and presents the 
way in which their approach has evolved throughout the years. The article analyses 
also the question of the formal initiation of proceedings concerning procedural 
violations and the importance of the use of a uniform and fair approach towards 
the scrutinized undertakings, especially as fine graduation is concerned. For that 
purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of past proceedings 
conducted by the European Commission and selected judgments of EU Courts.
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Résumé 
Le but de cet article est d’analyser la compétence puissante des autorités de 
la concurrence en Europe qui est l’imposition des amendes pour l’absence 
de coopération dans la cadre d’une procédure administrative en matière de 
concurrence.Quoique ces amendes sont imposées très rarement dans la pratique, 
l’article considère les expériences actuelles de l’autorité de la concurrence polonaise 
et de la Commission européenne et présente la manière dont leur approche de 
cette question a évoluée dans le temps. De plus, l’article comporte une analyse du 
problème de l’ouverture formelle de la procédure et d’importance de l’approche 
juste et uniforme aux entreprises engagés dans cette procédure, en particulier 
concernant la graduation de l’amende. Dans ce but, l’article aussi comporte l’analyse 
comparative des procédures déjà conduites par la Commission européenne et des 
jugements sélectionnés des cours de l’Union européenne.
Classifications and key words: fines; antitrust proceedings; dawn raid; inspection; 
cooperation; procedural infringements.
I. Introduction 
In Europe, both state antitrust authorities as well as the European 
Commission (hereafter, Commission’)1 are equipped by their respective laws 
with the competence to discipline undertakings2. Those infringing competition 
rules can be fined at the level determined (and limited) by the size of their 
revenue generated in past fiscal years. Recent case law shows a very decisive 
approach being taken towards violators as a result of which a number of severe 
fines have been imposed both in Poland and the EU3. Clearly, there are other 
factors influencing the size of the fine aside from the company’s economic 
1 The term antitrust authorities will in this article apply to both EU member states’ antitrust 
authorities as well as to the Commission when acting on the basis of Treaty provisions on 
competition protection.
2 It should be noted that the term ‘undertaking’ is used mainly in EU legislation and case 
law whereas Polish antirust generally refers to companies and other entities participating in 
antitrust proceedings as ‘entrepreneurs’. In this article the term ‘undertaking’ and the term 
‘entrepreneur’ are used as synonyms.
3 Exemplified best by the record fines imposed by the UOKiK President in the Grupa 
Ożarów decision of 8 December 2009, DOK-7/09 (fines of PLN 411,586,477, see further 
comments herein) and by the Commission in the Microsoft Case T-201/04 of 17 September 2007 
(fine of EUR 497,000,000). As calculated by John M. Connor, the severity of the 2007–2009 
cartel fines under the 2006 Commission Guidelines is more than five times higher than those 
figured under the 1998 Guidelines, John M. Connor, ‘Has the European Commission become 
more severe in punishing cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines’ (2011) 32(1) ECLR 27–36.
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strength. They include: the scale, character and severity of the infringement and 
possibly even the social response to the imposed penalty4. Before determining 
and imposing fines, antitrust authorities are thus obliged to diligently analyze 
the facts of each case and gather evidence that supports their final evaluation. 
Proving that an infringement of competition law took place may at times turn 
out to be extremely difficult because unlawful market practices are often agreed 
upon and conducted in secret. As a result, it is frequently difficult to find hard 
proof and/or witnesses to a competition law infringement. At times therefore, 
even the sole support of ‘soft evidence’ is permissible when building a case against 
the culprits5. Furthermore, the fines themselves need to be directly related to 
the facts and character of the infringement committed. Although they may be 
of substantial value (as past experience shows), the rules and policy followed 
by the authorities as regards the imposition of fines for antirust infringements 
are generally transparent. They can be found in the extensive body of case law 
relevant to the imposition of fines in competition law proceedings as well as 
in the official guidelines issued by the respective antitrust authorities. Two soft 
law acts should be emphasized here that are of particular relevance to both 
the Polish and European market: (i) Commission Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23 (2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/20036 and 
(ii) Explanations regarding the setting of the level of fines for practices restricting 
competition of the Polish Antitrust Authority (hereafter, UOKiK)7 (hreafter, 
Commission Guidelines and UOKiK Guidelines respectively)8. However, neither 
of these acts refers expressively to fines for procedural infractions committed 
within antitrust proceedings which may be imposed on the basis of Article 106(1)
(2) of the Polish Act on Competition and Consumer Protection9 (hereafter, 
Competition Act), Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
4 This issue was addressed recently by EU Commissioner Joaquín Almunia in his speech 
given at the Revue Concurrences conference: ‘New Frontiers of Antitrust 2011’ in Paris on 11 
February 2011, available at http://europa.eu, section press releases, reference SPEECH/11/96.
5 Especially visible when it comes to coordinated parallel behavior which, as stated by the 
European Court of Justice (presently: Court of Justice) ‘may not by itself be identified with 
a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads 
to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market’ 
(judgement of 14 July 1972 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries), see also K. Kohutek ‘Komentarz 
do art. 1 Rozporządzenia 1/2003 (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16/12/02 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia 
wżycie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu’, SIP Lex el/2006.
6 OJ [2006] C 06/3.  
7 UOKiK Official Journal [2009] 1, p. 1–3.
8 On the character of Commission Guidelines – see judgment of the European Court of 
Justice of 28 June 2005 in combined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C- 205/02 P, C-208/02 and 
C-213/02 P. in the Dansk Rørindustri and others v European Commission, ECR [2005] I-5425.
9 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, as amended.
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Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereafter, the Regulation 1/2003) and Article 
14(1) of Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings (hereafter, Regulation 139/2004) (the 
latter two referred here as EU Regulations). The terms ‘fines for procedural 
infractions/violations’ and ‘fines for the lack of cooperation’ within antitrust 
proceedings shall be understood widely in this article and apply to fines imposed 
as a consequence of all violations of a procedural character which may take 
place within such proceedings, that is, also during inspections. In practice, they 
are often referred to as ‘procedural fines’, as opposed to ‘substantive fines’ for 
competition law infringements – this however seems imprecise due to the also 
‘procedural’ character of periodic penalty payments referred to in Article 107 
of the Competition Act. 
Considering that case law on fines for procedural violations is extremely 
sparse and at times incoherent, the question remains therefore – how and 
exactly in what circumstances should such fines be imposed by European 
antitrust authorities, and how far does their discretion go with respect to their 
size? Can this instrument be seen as the ‘ultimate weapon’ of competition law 
enforcement allowing antitrust authorities to impose multimillion fines on 
undertakings without conducting a full investigation of their alleged breach 
of competition law? 
II.  Grounds and level of fine imposition on the basis of the Polish 
Competition Act, Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 139/2004
There are currently three legal acts which regulate fine imposition for 
the lack of cooperation within antitrust proceedings. Deciding which act is 
applicable in any given case is determined firstly by the ‘host’ of the primary 
proceedings (i.e. the Competition Act when conducted by the UOKiK 
President or one of the EU Regulations when conducted by the Commission), 
and secondly, by the subject matter of the main case (i.e. Regulation 1/2003 in 
alleged violations of Article 101 and 102 TFEU and Regulation 139/2004 for 
alleged violations of merger control rules10). The construction of the respective 
rules is rather similar (Article 106(1)(2) of the Polish Competition Act, Article 
23(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 14(1) of Regulation 139/2004), almost 
identical in fact in the case of the two EU Regulations. There are nevertheless 
some differences that deserve attention.
10 The latter division is relevant to EU competition law only which, unlike the Competition 
Act, regulates separately the issue of restrictive practices and merger control. 
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Pursuant to the Polish Competition Act, fines for procedural infractions 
within antitrust proceedings may be imposed by the UOKiK President generally 
in two cases only – when a given undertaking, intentionally or unintentionally,
(i)  either refuses to provide the UOKiK President with requested 
information or documents, or provides false or misleading information or 
documents (Article 106(2)(1) and Article 106(2)(2) of the Competition 
Act), or
(ii)  fails to cooperate with the UOKiK President in the course of an 
inspection conducted within the primary antitrust proceeding (Article 
16(2)(3) of the Competition Act).
With respect to fines, the term ‘failure to cooperate’ is thus expressly 
used only in relation to inspections (Article 106(2)(3) of the Competition 
Act). On the other hand, neither Regulation 1/2003 nor Regulation 139/2004 
address the obligations placed on undertakings in this context in general as 
‘obligations to cooperate’ and indicate specific behavior which is considered 
as an infringement. Aside from inspections, cases in which undertakings are 
threatened with fines for their lack of cooperation are all related to situations 
concerning the provision of information and documents. This terminological 
discrepancy in Article 106(2) of the Competition Act is partially explained by the 
fact that antitrust proceedings generally have a written character. The contact 
between UOKiK (or the Commission) and the scrutinized undertaking(s) is 
therefore limited to the exchange of procedural writs on the ‘inquiry – answer’ 
basis. The vast majority of cases in which a given undertaking may ‘fail to 
cooperate’ take place during the provision of documents in writs addressed 
to the antitrust authority. By contrast, inspections conducted in the course of 
antitrust proceedings are situations where the undertaking and its employees 
come into direct contact with UOKiK officials. Hence, the forms in which the 
company (its employees) can obstruct an inspection are virtually unlimited11. 
Thus, the premise of a ‘failure to cooperate’ referred to in Article 106(2)(3) 
of the Competition Act allows the UOKiK President to impose a fine upon an 
undertaking which obstructs in any way the course of an inspection performed 
11 Practice shows that the ‘creativity’ of such undertakings and their staff is also ‘unlimited’ 
when it comes to making the officials’ job in the course of an inspection as difficult as possible. 
E.g. in one of the inspections carried out by the Spanish antitrust authority, a company CEO 
almost literally tried to run away with a series of documents and photos removed from his 
closet in the presence of the inspectors. (Extraco case, Resolución de la Comisión Nacional de 
la Competencia of 6 May 2010, case ref. SNC/0007/10. About the power of inspection see also: 
M. Pedraz Calvo, ‘Competition authorites’ power of investigation and respect of fundamental 
rights: Inviolability of domicile’ [in:] M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Zmiany w polityce konkurencji 
na przestrzeni ostatnich dwóch dekad, Warszawa 2010, pp. 113–124.
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according to Articles 105a – 105l of the Competition Act, irrespective of the 
form of the obstruction12.
The different approach adopted in Article 106 of the Competition Act with 
respect to antitrust proceedings as a whole and inspections in particular, makes 
its construction incoherent and can thus lead to legal problems in practice. 
Above all, the closed catalogue of illegal behaviors specified in Article 106(2)
(1) and 106(2)(2) of the Competition Act can leave some situations beyond the 
scope of penalizalization. In Article 106(2)(2) for example, the legislator refers 
precisely to situations where an undertaking is obliged to provide the antitrust 
authority with specific information when summoned to do so13. Polish doctrine 
correctly indicates14 that information requests authorized by Article 28(3) of 
the Competition Act are omitted. As a result, there is currently no legal basis 
to impose a fine on an undertaking that fails to comply with an information 
request issued by the UOKiK President regarding the scope of the fulfillment 
of its obligations imposed by a decision issued pursuant to Article 28(1) of 
the Competition Act. This problem would have been eliminated if the Polish 
legislator used a general premise of a ‘failure to cooperate’ with respect to the 
entirety of antitrust proceedings (similarly to inspections conducted therein) 
complemented by an exemplary catalogue of procedural violations.
Unlike Article 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 14(1) of Regulation 
139/2004, Article 106(2) of the Polish Competition Act does not specifically list 
the ‘breaking of official seals’ affixed in the course of an inspection. Both EU 
Regulations address this issue in provisions15 separate from those concerning 
general cooperation (lack thereof) during antitrust inspections – a fact that 
shows the particular importance associated with this matter by the EU 
legislator. Furthermore, both Regulations (‘seals affixed have been broken’) 
set a very high level of liability of the scrutinized undertaking where broken 
seals are found, irrespective of who and in what circumstances was responsible 
for their breaking. As a result, the construction of this legal provision de facto 
causes the reversal of the burden of proof normally associated with antitrust 
proceedings as it is the undertaking that must prove that it had nothing to do 
with the breaking of the seal16 rather than the authority. Seeing as the Polish 
legislator failed to create a separate premise for fine imposition in such cases, 
12 Similarly A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki, ‘Komentarz do ustawy o ochronie konkurencji 
ikKonsumentów – Komentarz do art. 106’, points 3.2.2. SIP LEX el/2011.
13 I.e. referred to in Art. 94(2), Art. 12(3), Art. 19(3) or Art. 50 of the Competition Act. 
14 M. Król-Bogomilska [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Komentarz do ustawy 
o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Warszawa 2009, p. 1617.
15 Art. 23(1)(e) Regulation 1/2003 and Art. 14(1)(f) Regulation 139/2004 respectively.
16 That was precisely the case in the E.ON. Energie case (see pt. IV.2 herein) where the 
fine was imposed by the Commission de facto because it found the undertaking’s explanations 
concerning the possible reasons for the braking of the seal as not probable and reliable enough.
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the legal basis for the evaluation of the breaking of official seals in Poland 
should be found in Article 106(2)(3)17 of the Competition Act. Therefore, if 
it is established in the course of an inspection that seals previously affixed 
by UOKiK officials in the premises of the scrutinized undertaking have 
indeed been broken – such situation bares analogue consequences to the 
aforementioned provisions of both EU Regulations. 
Accordingly, fines for the failure to cooperate within antitrust proceedings 
are determined on the basis of the turnover generated by the culprit and 
may reach a maximum of 1% of its yearly turnover. The methodology of 
that provision is analogue to that of fine imposition for competition law 
infringements, where the turnover limit is set at a much higher level of 10%.
However, Article 106(2) of the Polish Competition Act limits fines for 
procedural infractions by the maximum threshold of EUR 50.000.000. This 
provision seems to indicate prima facie that the size of the fines is not related 
to the level of turnover generated by the offender in the fiscal year previous 
to the year where the fine is imposed. UOKiK’s decisional practice shows 
however that financial penalties imposed for the lack of cooperation remain 
connected to the offender’s economic strength, hence their yearly turnover 
is also taken into consideration18. The imposition of such fines is generally 
directly preceded by a UOKiK request for detailed information regarding the 
scrutinized undertaking’s financial results. As such, this is an analogue step 
to the conduct prior to the imposition of fines on the basis of Article 106(1) 
of the Competition Act.
III. Initiation of proceedings
If in the course of an antitrust proceeding an undertaking suspected of 
an infringement of competition law19 refuses to cooperate, the antitrust 
authority has generally two ways to handle this fact. The first option is to 
‘include it’ in the final decision ending the antitrust proceedings, the second 
is to address it directly and independently from the final verdict. In the first 
case, the procedural violation would be treated as an aggravating circumstance 
influencing the level of the overall fine imposed for the competition law 
17 Breaking of a seal would be thus considered, depending on the case, as an intentional or 
unintentional lack of cooperation in the course of an inspection.
18 E.g. see pt 108 of the decision of the UOKiK President of 4 November 2010, DOK-9/2010 
(Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa).
19 Entities other than the suspects may be subject to a document request or inspection.
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infringement20. In the second case, separate proceedings would have to be 
initiated in order to impose a fine for the failure to cooperate, independent to 
the proceedings in the course of which the procedural infraction occurred in 
the first place21. The initiation of formal proceedings regarding the imposition 
of a fine for non-cooperation would be generally justified (i) either by the 
violation being committed by a entity other than the one suspected of the 
infringement of competition law or (ii) the procedural violation committed by 
the ‘main suspect’ is so grave, that it would seriously jeopardizes the outcome 
of the primary case. The rationale for this evaluation is clear in the first 
situation, infraction committed by another party, because the initiation of 
separate proceedings is the only way to assess the procedural violation and 
fine it. The second situation requires however separate attention. 
Without a doubt, the competence of antitrust authorities to impose 
multimillion fines for procedural violations is meant to have a preventive 
character. Undertakings should be discouraged from attempting to unlawfully 
influence the investigation by concealing certain facts and information or by 
misleading the officials. It is easy to imagine a situation for example, when 
certain documents are deliberately destroyed by company staff during an 
inspection, prior to which UOKiK officials had justified expectations of finding 
evidence of allegedly anti-competitive practices. At times, especially in cartel 
cases, it is very difficult to find hard proof for unlawful conduct. Therefore, 
the deletion from a hard-drive of a set of emails for instance may at times 
hinder or potentially even preclude the antitrust authority from building a 
case against the scrutinized undertaking. In such cases, the authority’s ability 
to prove that a certain document was destroyed in the course of an inspection 
is very likely to indicate that such undertaking was in fact engaged in illegal 
practices. Nevertheless, high probability is in itself not sufficient to justify the 
imposition of a fine for an infringement of competition law in the primary 
case. The antitrust authority must therefore initiate separate proceedings 
regarding the procedural violation. An undertaking should in no way benefit 
from the fact that the main proceedings were obstructed by it or its employees. 
If the antitrust authority decided to assess the violation of the obligation to 
cooperate in its decision regarding the main infringement, failure to cooperate 
could potentially have an impact on both of those violations. According to the 
Commission and UOKiK Guidelines, an obstruction of antitrust proceedings 
can be treated as an aggravating factor that makes it possible to increase the 
20 Assuming the undertaking is found guilty and fined – the direct legal basis for a fine 
increase would be Art. 111 of the Competition Act, Art. 23(3) of Regulation 1/2003 and 14(3) 
of Regulation 139/2004.
21 On the independent character of both of the proceedings vide K. Kohutek, ‘Komentarz 
do art. 161 ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów’, point 1, SIP LEX el/2008.
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overall level of fine imposed for the competition law infringement. However, 
non-cooperation is in such cases directly connected with the main infringement 
which the undertaking is accused of. If, by appealing the antitrust decision 
for instance, the undertaking managed to prove that there was insufficient 
evidence of the main infringement, then the court would have to annul the 
decision in its entirety. In consequence, the procedural infraction, even if clear 
and proven beyond all doubt, would remain unpunished.
On the other hand, if the antitrust authority managed in the same situation 
to gathered enough evidence to impose a fine for the primary infringement, 
the deliberate destruction or concealment of evidence should be treated as an 
aggravating factor enabling the authority to further increase the overall fine, 
rather than assessing the obstruction in a separate decision. Such approach 
should be justified by reasons of procedural economy – the initiation of 
separate proceedings generally prolongs the main investigation because the 
authority must engage its resources in two separate cases that are formally 
independent from each other. Thus, where the undertaking fails to distort the 
course of the main proceedings, there is no justifiable reason to open separate 
proceedings addressing its procedural infractions since they would delay the 
imposition of the ‘main’ fine for the infringement of competition law. 
Nevertheless, considered should also be arguments that could lead to an 
opposite conclusion. To illustrate, the maximum level of fines for competition 
law infringements should in no event exceed 10 % of the offender’s yearly 
turnover22. It is possible that the imposition of a maximum fine is justified 
by the scale, character and duration of the restrictive practice alone. In such 
cases, procedural non-cooperation could no longer act as an aggravating 
circumstance for a further fine increase. But does this mean that the culprit 
actually benefited from this situation? After all, it still received the highest 
possible fine. 
It should be born in mind that the proceedings regarding non-cooperation 
and the main antitrust investigation are closely related even if they are formally 
independent from each other. Also connected should therefore be the level 
of the fine which may be imposed on the same undertaking for its procedural 
violations and substantive infringements. The fine cap was set out by both 
the Polish and EU legislator intentionally. Stressing that the level of all fines 
should remain in adequate proportion to the economic strength of the culprit23, 
it was nevertheless decided that exceeding a certain maximum level would be 
unreasonable. Irrespective of the number of aggravating factors which could 
be applied in a given case, no antitrust fine should thus go above the cap. 
22 Art. 106(1) of the Competition Act, Art. 23(2) Regulation 1/2003 and Art. 14(2) 
Regulation 139/2004 respectively.
23 E.g. see the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 27 June 2000, I CKN 793/98.
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Penalizing an undertaking already receiving a maximum fine for an antitrust 
infringement with yet another fine for a procedural violation, only because 
this is possible due to the formal separation of the two proceedings, would be 
considered excessive and contradict the general rules of the Competition Act 
and EU Regulations.
IV. Hereto fines imposed by the UOKiK President and the Commission
In general, fines for the failure to cooperate within antitrust proceedings 
are imposed rather rarely24. Nonetheless, the frequency and situations where 
they have indeed been used by the Commission and the UOKiK President vary 
significantly. Their respective decisional practice should thus be addressed 
separately.
1. Decisions of the UOKiK President
Although fines for procedural infractions within antitrust proceeding have 
been used rather regularly by the UOKiK President, their vast majority was 
not overly excessive. Out of approximately sixty of such fines imposed between 
2003 and 2010, only eleven reached the level of PLN 50,000 (app. EUR. 
12,500). However, five of the latter were imposed in 2010 alone25. Although 
their frequency has not greatly changed, a tendency to increase their severity 
can clearly be observed. Almost all of the procedural violations subject to 
a fine concerned situations, where the scrutinized undertaking either failed 
to provide the UOKiK President with the requested data or provided 
information which was false or misleading. By contrast, only a few of the 
decisions concerned the lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, it was that very 
non-cooperation in the course of a UOKiK inspection that has generated the 
highest fines imposed so far for procedural infractions in Poland.
For a long time however fines for the failure to cooperate in the course of an 
inspection did not differ greatly from those imposed by the UOKiK President 
for other procedural infractions. To illustrate, the Polish mobile operator 
PTK Centertel was fined PLN 16,730 (app EUR 4,100)26, Międzynarodowa 
24 Decisions imposing fines for non-cooperation amounted to only 1.7% of all UOKiK 
decisions issued in 2010. 
25 Information from the UOKiK website (www.uokik.gov.pl).
26 Decision of the UOKiK President of 19 September 2002, DD-79/2002.
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Korporacja Gospodarcza InCO – PLN 23,585 (app. EUR 5,900)27, and Unia 
Rozwoju i Wspierania Finansowego Sp. z o.o. – PLN 50,160 (app. EUR 
12,500)28. All three companies were penalized for refusing to provide UOKiK 
officials with documents requested during an inspection. Non-cooperation 
during inspections and during the remaining part of the proceedings was 
therefore treated similarly as far as the level of fines is concerned. The highest 
fine imposed by UOKiK until 2007 for a procedural infraction reached a mere 
PLN 101,975 (EUR 25,000). It was imposed on Visa International Service 
Association for its refusal to provide the requested data29.
However, by decision of 19 April 2007, the UOKiK President imposed a fine 
of PLN 2.000.000 (EUR 522.030) on Grupa Ożarów30 for its attempt to conceal 
and change the content of crucial documents during a UOKiK inspection. 
The inspection was conducted in the course of an antitrust investigation 
regarding a price cartel on the Polish cement production market. The cartel 
proceedings ended with a decision whereby six cartel participants were fined 
a total of PLN 411,586,477 (app. EUR 102,900,000)31. The UOKiK President 
referred in the final decision to a series of aggravating factors concerning 
Grupa Ożarów, which eventually resulted in the imposition of a fine at the 
maximum level of 10% of the company’s yearly turnover32. Even though none 
of these circumstances concerned non-cooperation, it should be emphasized 
that Grupa Ożarów was in fact fined twice: for its infringement of competition 
law as well as for the lack of procedural cooperation33.
The PLN 2,000,000 fine imposed on Grupa Ożarów in 2007 reflected 
a definite shift in the approach of the UOKiK President to the level of fines for 
non-cooperation within antitrust proceedings. Still, all other decisions imposing 
such fines between 2007 and 2010 were significantly lower34 and concerned 
infractions in the provision of information. On 4 November 2010, the UOKiK 
President imposed however a fine of PLN 123,246,000 (EUR 30,000,000) on the 
mobile phone operator Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa35 for its failure to cooperate 
27 Decision of the UOKiK President of 22 March 2004, RPZ-7/2004.
28 Decision of the UOKiK President of 8 December 2004, RŁO-13/2004.
29 Decision of the UOKiK President of 8 May 2006, DAR-430-01/05/EK.
30 Decision of the UOKiK President of 19 April 2007, DOK-48/07.
31 Decision of the UOKiK President of 8 December 2009, DOK-7/09. The aforementioned 
fines are the highest ever imposed in a single case in history of the existence of the Polish 
antitrust authority.
32 The precise amount of the fine was not made public.
33 See in this scope pt III herein.
34 The highest fine in that period of time equaled PLN 150,000 (EUR 41,867), it was 
imposed by the UOKiK President on Zakład Energetyczny Warszawa – Teren by decision of 
12 December 2008, RWA-58/2008.
35 Decision of the UOKiK President of 4 November 2010, DOK-9/2010.
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in the course of an inspection conducted in its premises in connection with 
a suspected36 cartel agreement on the Polish mobile television market. The 
obstruction was said to have consisted of a delay in the start of the dawn raid 
and preventing UOKiK officials from accessing certain premises. A fine of a 
very similar amount of PLN 130,689,900 (EUR 33,000,000)37 was subsequently 
imposed on Polkomtel, another alleged participant of the same cartel for its 
obstruction of the inspection carried out simultaneously to that of Polska Telefonia 
Cyfrowa. Aside from delaying the start of the dawn raid, Polkomtel was accused 
of refusing to provide UOKiK officials with certain documents and a hard-drive 
disk from one of its computers. As the main antitrust proceedings have not yet 
been closed, reference to the potential fines is at this point impossible. It should 
be emphasized however that the fines for non-cooperation already imposed on 
both operators are the highest individual fines in the decisional practice of the 
UOKiK President so far. Having said that, both of the decisions were appealed 
by the mobile operators and thus their modification by the court cannot be 
excluded since the appeal proceedings are still pending.
2. Decisions of the Commission
When faced with the lack of procedural cooperation, the Commission has so 
far rarely exercised its competences to penalize such infractions in a separate 
decision. Indeed, stumbling against an undertaking’s unwillingness to produce 
the requested documents or cooperate in any other ways, the Commission was 
most likely to address such issues in its final antitrust decisions38. Formally, the 
legal basis for the imposition of fines for procedural infractions within antitrust 
proceeding was for a long time found in Article 15.1 Council Regulation No 
17/62 implementing Articles 81 and 82(4) of the Treaty (‘Regulation 17/62’)39, 
the legal predecessor of Regulation 1/2003. Regulation No 17/62 capped the 
maximum fine for procedural violations at the level of 5,000 ECU (later 
EUR) making past fines seem rather symbolic from today’s point of view. 
For example, in the decision of 14 October 1994, the Commission imposed 
the equivalent of ECU 5,000 on Akzo Chemicals BV40 for providing false 
36 The main proceedings have not yet been completed.
37 Decision of the UOKiK President of 24 February 2011, DOK-1/2001.
38 I.e. as aggravating circumstances such as e.g. in the Industrial Bags case (Decision of 30 
November 2005, case ref. COMP/38354) or the Bitumen case (Decision of 13 September 2006, 
case ref. COMP/F/38.456) where the fines for the primary infringement of competition law 
were raised by an additional 10%.
39 OJ [1962] pp. 204–262, as last amended by Regulation No. 1216/1999, OJ [1999] L 148/5.
40 Commission Decision 94/735/EC of 14 October 1994 (Akzo Chemicals BV).
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
FINES FOR FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITHIN ANTITRUST… 79
information about the existence of its offices in certain cities, and for denying 
Commission representatives entry to its managements’ offices. This decision 
can now be treated more as a curiosity than a basis for an evaluation of the 
level of Commission fines for procedural infractions or the infringement 
itself41. It is certainly not a coincidence that in the last years of the validity of 
Regulation 17/62, the Commission preferred to address non-cooperation in 
its final decisions42. By doing so, it could go around the fine cap imposed by 
its Article 15(1) and de facto increase the severity of the financial penalties 
imposed for infractions committed in the course of antitrust proceedings.
Taking the aforementioned into account, a representative analysis of the 
Commission’s position as regards fines for non-cooperation within antitrust 
proceedings should be made on the basis of current EU Regulations. The latter 
cap the maximum amount of fines to be imposed in such cases at a much higher 
level of 1% of the company’s yearly turnover. It was however only once that the 
Commission exercised its authority in this context under the new provisions. In 
the famous decision of 30 January 2008, a fine of EUR 38.000.000 was imposed 
on E.ON Energie AG43 for the braking of a Commission seal placed in the 
course of an inspection in E.ON’s premises. Even though the fine itself is of 
a clearly significant amount, the Commission emphasized that it was well below 
the theoretical maximum44. The financial penalty was moderated because it 
was the first time that a seal had ever been broken by a company subject to an 
inspection and the first time in which a fine was imposed under Article 23(1) 
Regulation 1/2003. The violation was however qualified as serious due to the 
fact that the broken seal was intended to secure a room in which all documents 
previously collected by the inspectors were stored (i.e. highly sensitive data). 
As these documents were not yet catalogued, the Commission was unable to 
ascertain whether, and if so which documents were actually removed by E.ON. 
In the course of the proceedings, the company denied having broken the seal 
listing a number of factors which could have caused the seal to break (the 
use of an aggressive cleaning product, the age of the seal and a high level of 
humidity45). The decision was however upheld in full by the General Court in 
its judgment of 15 December 201046. 
41 Nevertheless, cases existed where EU fines for non-cooperation did not reach the 
maximum level e.g. Commission Decision of 7 October 1992, case ref. IV/33.791 (CSM) 
imposing a fine of ECU 3.000 on CSM for its refusal to provide Commission officials with 
certain requested documents.
42 E.g. Industrial Bags and Bitumen cases.
43 Commission decision of 30 September 2008, case ref COMP/B-1/39.326 (E.ON Energie).
44 The fine reached only 14% of the maximum possible level.
45 Commission seals are made of plastic film, if removed, they do not tear, but show 
irreversible ‘VOID’ signs on their surface.
46 Judgment of the General Court T-141/08 E.ON Energie, not yet reported.
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Although the E.ON. decision is the only example of the Commission 
imposing a fine on the basis of Article 23.1 Regulation 1/2003, several other 
such cases are currently pending. Proceedings were opened in 2008 against 
Sanofi-Aventis47 for an alleged obstruction of an inspection. The procedural 
violation took the form of an initial refusal to let the officials examine and 
copy relevant documents until the French authorities produced a national 
search warrant. Three other companies were targeted in 2010 – proceedings 
are currently pending against the Energetický a průmyslový holding and J&T 
Investment Advisors48, Suarez Environment49 and Laboratoires Servier and 
Servier SAS50.
Increased activity of the Commission as regards procedural cooperation 
(lack thereof) within antitrust proceedings is thus certainly visible. More 
decisions of that type are to be expected shortly.
V. Fine graduation
The latest fines imposed by both the UOKiK President and the Commission 
signalize the disappearance of the trend to treat procedural violations 
committed in the course of antitrust proceedings less severely than substantive 
infringements of competition law itself. The same or a similar level of fines 
as those imposed on Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa, Polkomtel and even E.ON. 
Energie could have easily been observed in final infringement decisions. 
Unfortunately however, neither of these decisions unambiguously defines or 
clarifies what factors were taken into account by the authorities when setting 
the amount of these fines. There are furthermore no UOKiK or Commission 
guidelines that directly consider the issue of fine graduation in procedural 
cases and it is thus necessary to turn to other sources in order to establish what 
factors should be taken into consideration here. First of all, the level of fines 
for non-cooperation within antirust proceedings should remain in line with 
general principals of fine graduation51 similarly to any other antitrust fine. Both 
47 See Press release of 2 June 2008, MEMO/08/357.
48 Suspected non-cooperation with Commission officials during inspections and non-
disclosure of all documents relevant to the investigation, see press release of 28 May 2010, 
IP/10/627.
49 Suspected of breaking a seal in the course of the inspection, see press release of 4 June 
2010, IP/10/691.
50 Suspected of providing misleading and incorrect information, see press release of 26 July 
2010, IP/10/1009.
51 As stated by the Polish Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Sąd 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumenta; hereafter, SOKiK) in its judgment of 17 February 1999, 
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EU Regulations as well as the Competition Act contain specific provisions that 
indicate precisely which factors should be taken in consideration when setting 
the level of fines (i.e. the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement52). 
These factors are widely analyzed in both case law and doctrine53. Despite 
the fact that most of these discussions relate to fines for competition law 
infringements, rather than procedural non-cooperation, their conclusions 
should be taken into consideration in this context also.
First, since the given failure to cooperate takes place within given antitrust 
proceedings, the obstruction may by its nature influence the course and result 
of the main case. Therefore, the setting of fines for procedural infractions must 
take into consideration if they have influenced, and if so, to what a degree, the 
outcome of the primary proceedings. Antitrust authorities request information 
or documents from an undertaking in order to realize their statutory mission 
of finding and preventing competition law infringements54. By analogy, the 
objective of an inspection of the premises of a scrutinized undertaking is 
to verify the legality of its actions – to gather as much evidence as possible 
confirming the infringement of competition law or proving that no such 
violation took place55. If that objective has not been distorted by the procedural 
offence, the fine for non-cooperation should be fixed at a noticeable yet not 
excessive level56. In other words, when setting the fine, the authority should 
analyse what were the potential consequences of the obstruction and what 
‘benefits’ occurred as its result57. The gain to the scrutinized undertaking 
should be analyzed by taking into consideration its market power and influence 
on the market (established by its turnover)58. As stated by the Court of First 
fines should also be in accordance with the axiological objectives of the Competition Act which 
aims to develop market competition (XVII Ama 78/98).
52 Art. 111 Competition Act, Art. 23(3) Regulation 1/2003 and Art. 14(3) Regulation 
139/2004 respectively whereby the latter, for unexplained reasons, refers only to the ‘gravity 
and duration’.
53 See e.g. M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w prawie antymonopolowym, Warszawa 
2001, pp. 135–151; M. Król-Bogomilska, ‘Kary pieniężne w polskim prawie antymonopolowym 
na tle europejskiego prawa antymonopolowego’ (1998) 7 Państwo i Prawo; M. Sachajko, 
‘Administracyjna kara pieniężna jako element systemu sankcjonowania naruszeń wspólnotowych 
oraz polskich zakazów praktyk ograniczających konkurencję’ [in:] C. Banasiński, M. Kępiński, 
B. Popowska, T. Rabska (eds), Aktualne problemy polskiego i europejskiego prawa ochrony 
konkurencji, Warszawa 2006, p. 193 and positions indicated therin. 
54 Decision of the UOKiK President of 20 July 2010, RPZ-14/2010, p. 10.
55 Decision of the UOKiK President of 4 November 2010, DOK-9/2010, p. 12, pt. 44.
56 As for the form in which such fine should be imposed, i.e. as an independent fine or as 
an element of the “main’ substantive fine.
57 Judgment of SOKiK of 24 May 2006, XVII Ama 17/05.
58 See M. Sachajko, Administracyjna kara pieniężna…’, p. 195
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
82  KONRAD STOLARSKI
Instance59, in assessing the gravity of an infringement regard must be had to 
a large number of factors, the nature and importance of which vary according 
to the type of infringement in question and the particular circumstances of 
the case60. Therefore, considered should also be the subject matter of the 
main proceedings where the failure to cooperate took place. For instance, if 
it occurred during a cartel investigation, it would be reasonable to expect a 
higher fine than if it occurred in the course of a notification procedure for 
concentrations. 
Duration should also be assessed when possible in cases concerning non-
cooperation despite it being prima facie linked to the antitrust infringement 
instead. What may potentially have a decisive influence on the effectiveness 
of a procedural obstruction is, in particular, the time during which an 
undertaking refused to submit to a dawn raid and delayed officials from 
entering its premises61. Obviously, it is the surprising character of the dawn 
raid which should make it impossible for the undertaking to conceal or 
alter any documents, plan the content of statements etc. Nevertheless, the 
aforementioned does not mean that, a dawn raid has to start immediately62 
upon the officials’ arrival in the company premises. The undertaking must 
at least have the opportunity to review the authorization documents before 
consenting to the inspection, let the doorman contact its manager, in-house 
lawyer or the company’s external counsel etc. The time needed for a dawn raid 
to start has to be analyzed taking into consideration the size and character of 
the company – it should be short enough however to avoid delaying tactics63.
When fixing the level of a fine, antitrust authorities are of course also 
bound by general principles of EU law such as proportionality or observance 
of fundamental rights64 as well as general rules of administrative law65. The 
sanction cannot be disproportionate to the offence. The less disruptive the 
behavior, the less severe the sanction should be. It should be stressed that 
fines can be imposed under both EU Regulations and the Competition Act 
59 Currently the ‘General Court of the EU’.
60 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 5 April 2006, T-279/02 Degussa, ECR [2006] 
II-897, also judgment of the European Court of Justice (currently Court of Justice of the EU) 
of 10 May 2007 C-328/05 P SGL Carbon, ECR [2007] I-3921, para. 43.
61 Duration of the infringement was addressed in particular in the decision of the UOKiK 
President concerning Polska Telefonia Komórkowa (DOK-9/2010), see para. 98.
62 Undertaking are obliged to submit to an inspection without delay rather than immediately.
63 Similarly P. Berghe, A. Dawes, ‘Little pig, little pig let me come in’: an evaluation of 
the European Commission’s powers of inspection in competition cases’ (2009) 30(9) ECLR 8.
64 See judgment of the General Court of the European Union in the E.ON. Energie case, 
para. 274, similarly M. Sachajko, ‘Administracyjna kara pieniężna…’, p. 199.
65 Compare M. Wincenciak, Sankcje w prawie administracyjnym i procedura ich wymierzania, 
Warszawa 2008, p. 97.
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irrespective of the fact whether the procedural violation was intentional or 
not (i.e. committed by negligence). Case law and doctrine emphasize however 
that the scale of the fine should above all reflect the level of guilt associated 
with the infringement66. 
It should be noted finally that Polish case law and doctrine suggest that 
the level of fines in antitrust cases should depend on the level of the threat 
to the public interest associated with the violation (i.e. how possible is the 
occurrence of negative effects for competition and consumers67). However, the 
form in which the public interest is threatened or violated by a competition 
law infringement (e.g. by cartels) and a failure to cooperate within antitrust 
proceedings seems slightly different because competition is not distorted 
directly in the latter case. It may also occur nevertheless that an inadequate 
level of fine (too mild) would make undertakings ponder what would be more 
beneficial to them – a fine for non-cooperation or a fine for an infringement 
of competition law. Such situation is of course unacceptable.
VI. Conclusions
Fines for the failure to cooperate within antitrust proceedings are a powerful 
tool available to antitrust authorities in their fight against those that infringe 
competition law. This is true particularly because potentially severe fines 
for procedural violations can be imposed on the offender irrespective of 
the course of the main case and actual antitrust violation. Nevertheless, by 
no means should they be treated as a substitute for addressing the primary 
infringement. Fines for non-cooperation should have a preventive character 
without violating the right of defense and fair treatment of the scrutinized 
undertakings. Recent case law suggests that fines for the lack of cooperation are 
increasing, especially in the case of obstructions in the course of an inspection 
where the emotions of both the inspectors and the inspected play frequently 
a role. If antitrust authorities do meet with a failure to cooperate, high fines 
should not be imposed automatically simply because no incriminating material 
was found. Each case should be analyzed separately, taking into consideration 
all of the relevant factors both mitigating and aggravating. At the same time 
however, they should be considered in the light of the antitrust proceedings 
where they occurred in the first place.
66 See M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w prawie…, p. 90 and 93.
67 Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 24 May 2006, XVII 
Ama 17/05; M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne w prawie…’ p. 91, see also judgment of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 5 May 2009, P 64/07.
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